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Part 4 of The Will to Know, where Foucault turns to his most 
direct treatment of power, contains the often-cited statement, "In 
political thought and analysis, we have still not cut off the head of 
the King."' I will contend in what follows that Foucault's notion of 
power is much more radical than such a beheading implies. By 
exploring the contrariety between sovereignty and power, I will 
outline why Foucault's violence against the King is both more subtle 
and more devastating than would be an overt decapitation of the old 
monarch. 
Before he developed his conception of power, Foucault had 
already problematized the meaning of sovereignty in his 
archaeological writings, particularly The Order of Things and The 
Archaeology of Knowledge. But his discussion of power in The Will 
to Know renders redundant the King and all other sovereignties of the 
type he calls "juridico-discursive." 
In The Order of Things, for example, Foucault exhibits how the 
locus of sovereignty shifts in the Classical Age from what we might 
call a sovereignty of exteriority to a sovereignty of interiority. 2 Its 
locus shifts again from the Classical Age to the Modern period, from 
what Foucault calls a "symbolics of blood" to an "analytics of 
sexuality."3 On the one hand, Foucault shows how the locus of 
sovereignty changes in the Classical Age without either its structure 
being called into question or its theoretical warrant being exhibited; 
on the other hand, he illustrates just how paradoxical was the 
Classical model of sovereignty by utilizing the term sovereignty 
himself in all its richness and ambiguity. He refuses to adhere strictly 
' Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. I, trans. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Random House, 1978), 89. I follow James Miller in referring to this volume 
as Tlu> Will to Know. This is a more literal translation of Foucault's French title, La 
Volente de savoir. Because Hurley's English translation is entitled 77ie History of 
Sexuality: Volume 1, the notes will reflect this choice. Sec James Miller, Vie 
Passion of Michel Foucault (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993). 
2 I am grateful to John Carvalho of Villanova University for this phraseology and 
for his many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to 
express my appreciation for the thorough and incisive comments offered by Scott M. 
Christensen, of the University of California at Riverside, in his formal response to an 
earlier version of this paper delivered at the APA Pacific Division Meeting in Los 
Angeles, California on April 2, 1994. 
3 The History of Sexuality, V. I, 148. 
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to any univocal sense of sovereignty, exploiting the unexamined 
conceit inherent in that sovereignty. What is sovereign is 
simultaneously dominant and overlooked. In his interpretation of 
Velazquez's Las Meninas, for example, Foucault calls representation 
"that sovereign vanishing-point, indefinitely distant but constituent." 4 
Throughout The Order of Things, what is decisive in Foucault's 
analysis of the centripetal movement of sovereignty is that the 
essential structure and privilege of sovereignty remains furtive. It 
thereby escapes a critical examination within the classical episteme. 
Rather than effecting a qualitative transformation of the structure of 
sovereignty, the Classical Age merely privileges the individual, 
instead of the King, as sovereign, language instead of things, and the 
"I am" instead of the "I think." Foucault evinces how this privilege 
extends into at least five distinct spheres in all: (1) within the 
problem of representation; (2) within the "historical a priori" by 
which words and things are ordered; (3) within the sphere of the 
cogito; (4) within the domain of "man" as a constituting subject; and 
( 5 ) within the hermeneutic of the authorial voice and textuality. 
While space constraints do not permit elaboration of this theme 
in any great detail or allow much textual support for this thesis, 
Foucault's general point seems to be the following: while new 
representations of sovereignty were installed at the heart of its 
deployment, the same outmoded legitimating criteria substantiate its 
incursions into the Classical episteme. Foucault illustrates that even 
though different provincial authorities are held to be sovereign at 
different times, the net effect of this transition is simply the 
replacement of one delegation of sovereignty with another. He 
demonstrates that only the specific theater of the old sovereignty 
changes without this displacement really fracturing the structure of 
sovereignty itself. 
SOVEREIGNTY AND POWER IN THE WILL TO KNOW 
If power no longer resides in the old monarchies or their 
institutional apparatuses, if power can no longer be located in any 
unitary agencies whatsoever, then cutting off the King's head serves 
only to efface the symbolic figurehead of archaic principalities of 
power. In the classical conception of power, power is understood 
primarily as something to be possessed and wielded. Classical 
political theories treat power as a mode of agency or a substance 
resident in sovereign authority. Foucault maintains that such a view 
of power merely fastens upon the static symbols of the dynamic 
substrata he calls "power." What we see are only the effects of 
4 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Random House, 1970), 277. 
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power. On the classical view, power is always bound up with a 
system of law and the production of discourses, but Foucault argues 
that law is itself only the end product of a power/knowledge relation. 
What is more problematic is that the connection of power to law 
fosters an entirely negative understanding of power. It reduces power 
to something that restrains, constructs defenses, and blocks the 
exercise of other powers. This paradigm misses the positive, 
productive, inert, and propagational capabilities of power altogether. 
And in Foucault's view, it is its productive character that enables 
power to escape our notice while nonetheless proliferating and 
reconstellating in new forms and in more sophisticated guises. 
For Foucault, power does not reside primarily in governments, 
militaries, police, political office, or any of the other institutions 
traditionally thought to harbor it. It cannot even be made fully 
transparent by analyzing the institutions Foucault himself examines: 
prisons, hospitals, clinics, and asylums. Institutions are, he says, only 
the "terminal forms power takes" (92). He insists that we must begin 
to conceive the techniques of power as polymorphous and 
ubiquitous; wherever we look, power relations are "always already 
present" (82). If we must conceive of power without the King, as 
Foucault maintains, we cannot attribute the "real" power to the 
legislator, either, as power is, in a sense, its own "law," and because 
Foucault wants to sever the exclusive connection of power to law. 
This means that the shift in the locus of sovereignty in the Classical 
Age—from the monarch to the more amorphous authority found in 
law—must still be supervened by the subsequent analysis of power 
that dislodges power from such juridico-discursive systems. In 
Foucault's view, the instantiation of power as law is a secondary 
example of power. 
His stated objective in The Will to Know is to move toward "a 
definition of the specific domain formed by relations of power, and 
toward a determination of the instruments that will make possible its 
analysis" (82). This analysis can be constituted, he says, "only if it 
frees itself completely from a certain representation of power that I 
would term . . . 'juridicodiscursive'" (82). The juridico-discursive 
model of power has defined most political approaches to power prior 
to Foucault. Political philosophy has traditionally understood power 
as a perquisite of legitimate authority. On this view, power derives 
from law in order to be legitimate. Illegitimate power is arbitrary and 
falls outside of, or runs counter to, established law.5 Law derives its 
authority, in turn, from either a conception of natural right or 
consent. When authority is "legitimate," power and law are 
5 Foucault docs point out the irony in the way that absolute monarchy is viewed as 
illegitimate, even though it has its origin in law. See his discussion of this issue in 
The History of SexualitY, V.I, pp. 87-88. 
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coextensive. On this base/superstructure schema, power is thought to 
flow vertically. Countless sociopolitical theories of power have been 
constructed and analyzed on the basis of this model. Foucault shuns 
such a conception of power (94), maintaining that 
It is this image that we must break free of, that is, of 
the theoretical privilege of law and sovereignty, if 
we wish to analyze power within the concrete and 
historical framework of its operation (90). 
Since, for Foucault, "power is everywhere" (93), questions of 
legitimacy are as vacuous as an inquiry into the legitimacy of gravity 
or atmospheric conditions. For him, power relations are equally 
inescapable. Furthermore, if institutions where we traditionally look 
to uncover power serve only as power's terminal points, then one 
cannot explain what power is merely by enveloping traditional 
institutions in a veneer of authority. Foucault argues that to really 
understand power, we need to deploy methods "that go beyond the 
state and its apparatus" (89). 
Following this methodological imperative, Foucault's analysis 
disinters power from the privileged settings in which it has been 
conceptually embedded up to this point. The problem is that power 
cannot be made fully concrete even by analyzing the normative or 
punitive apparatuses of any complex relation of power and 
knowledge. Distinguishing his view from the classical understanding 
of power, Foucault writes: 
by power, I do not mean "Power" as a group of 
institutions and mechanisms that ensure the 
subservience of the citizens of a given state. By 
power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation 
which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the 
rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system 
of domination exerted by one group over another 
(92). 
The challenge here is to abandon any definition that equates power 
with institutions, law, or the various techniques of subjugation and 
domination exercised by one individual or group over others. 
This juridico-discursive model, according to Foucault, continues 
to underlie "recent analyses concerning the relationships of power to 
sex." 6 Taking the juridico-discursive paradigm for granted has given 
6 Ibid., p. 89. For Foucault, psychoanalysis from Freud to Lacan has failed to 
extricate sex from the old techniques of power. I will return below to this problem. 
Cf. also Part 5 of The Wilt to Know. 
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rise to the focus upon desire as a sort of "natural law." Foucault 
vitiates the notion of "desire" for not being fundamental enough 
insofar as it assumes the status of a law. Whatever "desire" is, it is 
itself produced by, and constructed within, power relations. Foucault 
writes, "Where there is desire, the power relation is already present" 
(81). It is not a matter, however, of determining whether desire is 
prior to a framework of law or alien to it; these questions are beside 
the point. In Foucault's view, such an approach continues to situate 
desire in relation to a notion of power that remains juridical and 
discursive, a power that still has its primary efficacy "in the 
enunciation of the law" (90). 
Foucault understands power as something relational. He 
describes power as traversing through a "multiplicity of force 
relations" (93). It cannot be reduced to a single origin or telos; it 
insinuates itself into, and courses through, constantly mutable 
interstices of those force relations. 7 Power, for Foucault, is "the 
moving substrata of force relations"(93), having no "inner" or 
"outer" domain. If we say metaphorically that we are "within" power 
relations, then we must be clear that there is no exteriority to such 
relations. In Foucault 's view, we are always already within a 
particular interstitial coalescence of power dynamics that one may 
sometimes transgress, and occasionally transform, but never escape. 
Likewise, each set of discourses and practices produces others 
with new discourses erupting within the shifting constellations of 
power. According to Foucault, we conduct ourselves within a 
network in which all discourses can be viewed as interlocking and 
hierarchized articulations of power relations. There is a kind of 
symbiosis or synergy between power and discourse, wherein new 
"enunciative modalities" represent necessary conditions for the 
operation of new strategies of power. 
What is more, each constellation of discourses and practices 
delimits and supports its particular standard of truth. This means that, 
for Foucault, truth does not exist outside of a complex relation of 
power/knowledge. Since any claim to truth has purchase only within 
a particular power/knowledge relation, truth cannot be thought to 
control, constrain, or judge power. For Foucault, truth and power are 
inextricably bound together; power's exercise and the construction of 
truth are intertwined and coterminous. 8 
7 Foucault gives his clearest definition of power on pp. 92-93 of The History of 
Sexuality V.I, at the very beginning of the section entitled "Method." 
8 Sec especially the essay, "Power and Truth," in Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings (1972-1977), 109-133. Foucault vitiates the 
humanistic position, which rests on an unshakable faith in the progress of history, 
and on the belief in an inner being of man that needs to be liberated or uncovered. 
For Foucault, it is an illusion to assume that philosophy can stand outside of 
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Nowhere is the conjunction of the exercise of power and the 
fabrication of truth more explosive than in the domain of sexuality. 
Foucault argues that since the end of the eighteenth century, the 
mechanisms of power have been directed toward the proliferation 
and control of life and the body rather than blood and death. He 
terms this modern deployment of power the "analytics of sexuality" 
and sees it as engendering "an entire micro-power concerned with 
the body" (146). This modern form of power has delineated, 
according to Foucault, an extensive matrix of "comprehensive 
measures, statistical assessments, and interventions aimed at the 
entire social body or at groups taken as a whole" (146). 
Foucault depicts how the construction of sexuality within a 
shifting nexus of power relations insures that power's tactics will 
permeate every aspect of individual existence. He maintains that the 
politics of sexuality have generated an entire complex of disciplines 
intersecting the body that serve to regulate the body-politic. Foucault 
sees a wide range of tactics combining within what he terms a 
"technology of sex." This technology serves the dual objective of 
"disciplining the body" and of "regulating populations" (146). 
In a loosely historical manner, Foucault argues that for the last 
two hundred years, but especially since the end of the nineteenth 
century, sex has functioned as the point of convergence between the 
control of the body and control of the species.9 He argues that it is no 
longer the right over death that is the exclusive jurisdiction of 
sovereignty but the control over life. When power could be 
justifiably connected to law and sovereignty, it appeared as a 
symbolism of blood that reached its most fatal concretization in the 
monarch's sword. But, for Foucault, the axis of power has shifted 
since the Classical Age from this "symbolics of blood to an analytics 
of sexuality" (148). He sees blood, law, death, transgression, and 
sovereignty as characterizing one deployment of power and an 
altogether different set of strategies to be connected with sexuality, 
norms, knowledge, life, and regulatory power (148). As the 
procedures and strategies of power change, so must the methods of 
discursive formations. He argues that such presumptive distancing is impossible, 
because there are no objects or values prior to, or outside of, a domain of discourse. 
We arc always already within a complex relation of power/knowledge that, as 
perforce a regime of truth, prefigures what counts as true within that constellation of 
power and knowledge. Foucault shows this systematically in Chapter 2 of The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, where he treats the way these "discursive formations," 
"enunciativc modalities," or "historical a prion's" arc engendered. He continues by 
showing how various norms arc established within a particular regime of power, and 
how each regime enforces compliance to these norms. 
9 Foucault writes, "Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the 
life of the species." See The Will to Know, 146. 
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its analysis. The failure to adapt one's methodology to the innovative 
methods of power is at the heart of Foucault's critique of Freud, for 
example, whose retrieval of the idea of desire reveals what Foucault 
describes as "the theoretical effort to reinscribe the thematic of 
sexuality in the system of law, the symbolic order and sovereignty" 
(150). Whether or not Foucault's argument is more theoretical than 
historical, he wants to insist that the methods of the deployment of 
sexuality differ from the methods of the deployment of the symbolics 
of blood. The procedural requirement this difference creates cannot 
be overlooked if we really wish to account for power. "We must," 
Foucault writes, "conceptualize the deployment of sexuality on the 
basis of the techniques of power that are contemporary with it" 
(150). 
Foucault explains that the movement from law as the locus of 
sovereignty to life itself was accompanied by an entirely unique 
implementation of power. He says that these two different formations 
of power grew out of wholly different regimes of power, though 
there are inevitable overlappings and interactions between them. 
Nonetheless, he endeavors to deconstruct the old couplings of 
power-law and power-sovereignty, eschewing them as inadequate to 
the task of understanding the infiltration of power 's various 
interdictions into sexual behaviors and practices. In short, the 
juridico-discursive model of power has outlived its usefulness. Even 
when the tactics of power were organized primarily around death, 
law, right, and punishment, Foucault does not seem to consider this 
account of power to be exhaustive. But now that regulation, 
normalization, and control describe the methods of power 's 
operation, it is clear that any analysis of power must be able to 
expose tactics that do not terminate in the state apparatus. 
The old juridico-discursive model of sovereignty misses entirely 
the subtle domination of ubiquitous power that infiltrates every 
aspect of life. Most of all, it misses the productive potential of the 
new forms of power, the pervasive capability of creating and 
propagating rather than simply restraining or denying. Foucault 
emphasizes this productive dimension of power, which first arouses 
and then delineates the universal concern with sex only thereby to 
exercise dominion over both the body and the body-politic. To grasp 
the gratuitous proliferation of discourses around sex would seem to 
necessitate a highly mobile conception of power, and this is what 
Foucault struggles to adumbrate in the theoretical first volume of The 
History of Sexuality. Foucault explicates the theoretical consequence 
of the shifting strategies of power throughout this work. What he 
calls the "viewpoint of the objective" supplants the privilege of the 
law, "tactical efficacy" replaces prohibition, and the classical 
conception of sovereignty gives way to his analysis of a "multiple 
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and mobile field of force relations, wherein far-reaching, but never 
completely stable, effects of domination are produced" (102). 
In Part 5 of The Will to Know, Foucault increasingly marshals the 
dynamics of power to highlight the techniques of normalization and 
control. He is not claiming that law and institutional apparatuses 
disappear or recede completely in significance but rather that "the 
law operates more and more as a norm," while juridical institutions 
are incorporated more and more into a "continuum of apparatuses 
(medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most 
part regulatory" (144). 
With his notions of "anatomo-politics" and "bio-power," 
Foucault shows that the question of sovereignty is no longer a 
question of bringing death upon political subjects or, conversely, of 
letting them live; the sovereign no longer needs to control death by 
employing the sword to draw the line between the obedient subjects 
and the enemies of the ruler or state. When sex is sovereign, the task 
of power becomes one of "distributing the living in the domain of 
value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and 
hierarchize, rather than to display itself in its murderous splendor" 
(144). Foucault's analysis of a normalizing society brings together 
the body and his theory of power. He holds that a new form of power 
emerges when the technology of power centers upon life. 
When the mechanisms of power are directed toward the body, 
and through the body, to the body-politic, to the generation of life, 
and to sex as the juncture of pleasure and preservation, the result is a 
strategy of power in the twentieth century that, for Foucault, forms 
and stylizes the most intimate, far-reaching, and ready to hand 
behaviors of human life. But if sexuality is a construction of, and 
within, power, this would imply that there can be no constant, 
intrinsic norm for sexuality but only various "sexualities," and these 
are never independent of power relations. The social, political, and 
economic construction of sexuality renders sex an instrument of 
power's design (150). 
Only by radically questioning the presupposition of sex as an 
"anchorage point that supports the manifestations of sexuality," 
Foucault writes, can we ever reconstruct such a "complex idea 
formed inside the deployment of sexuality" (152). His project strives 
to exhibit the formation of sexual identities through the production 
and regulation of discourses and practices that develop within the 
diverse and camouflaged syncretizations of power. 
Foucault's conclusions about the conscription of the body and 
the machinery of the body-politic by the systems for the production 
of normalcy afford this inquiry a position from which to tally several 
important results. We have distinguished "sovereignty" from 
"power," tracing how the sovereignty of sex comes to replace the 
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juridico-discursive sovereignty of blood in The Will to Know. W e 
have followed Foucault in considering power as a complex, 
relational dynamic that remains when we do away with the image of 
the King or the Prince. We have also seen that, for Foucault, the 
strategies of power are not constant but vary according to their 
structure and locus. Finally, we have noted briefly that, for Foucault, 
the complex construction of "sexuality" assumes divergent forms and 
employs a myriad of local efficacies for inscribing itself within social 
bodies. 
In my view, the radicality and strength of Foucault's analysis lies 
chiefly in the way it traces the diffuse tactics of regulation and 
normalization into the discourses and practices of the modern era. 
What remained the province of the juridico-discursive sovereignties 
within the Classical Age has become more fragmented and 
ubiquitous, more productive and regulatory. Foucault's critique of 
the humanistic ideal of emancipation issues from his genealogy of 
this inescapable system of power. As we have seen, the techniques of 
power aim to foster normalcy through interventions in the domain of 
everyday discourses and practices. The discipline that power 
engenders is more aptly characterized by the production of 
acceptable behaviors than by the constant effort to check the 
impulses to misbehave. In the face of this self-discipline, punishment 
is no longer necessary. Under the weight of such exhaustive and 
preemptive self-control, we strive to demonstrate that we are not in 
need of any additional regimens or "treatments." Without 
transforming Foucault into a critical theorist, we could say that we 
struggle to display ourselves as responsible agents who require no 
rehabilitation. For Foucault, the irony is that while we organize and 
order ourselves all the more rigidly within what he calls the "austere 
monarchy of sex" (159), we labor under the illusion that it is our 
"liberation" that hangs in the balance. 
